I can see why somebody would take this stance, however I discover it a bit uncharitable. As Schulz explains elsewhere, he understands progressivism because the political tendency of governing officers (each Democrat and Republican, as he explicitly qualifies) to talk “not simply off script, however off sacred textual content.” An implication is that the liberal political order can solely survive if sure texts—on this case the Structure and Declaration of Independence—are allowed a form of sacred authoritative standing. This doesn’t imply blind or robotic strategy to those texts, however moderately a willingness to respect them by default—to dwell in them, because it have been, such that they type the vocabulary and construction of how we expect, communicate, and act. (As an apart, I discover it extremely unlikely, to not point out false, that everybody who dogmatically accepts textual authority is unreasonable.)
Schulz makes an identical level about training: training is progressive when it abandons dwelling in and with texts for the sake of some various political agenda for the longer term. On this context, he identifies pragmatism with John Dewey’s instructional prioritization of science and scientific methodology over sacrosanct texts (within the above sense); and he thinks of neo-pragmatism as logically downstream from this, typified in Richard Rorty’s relativist view that each one we are able to hope for are small-T, parochial truths.
Marxism, for Schulz, is known as an outgrowth of the identical impulses that encourage the primary two actions: suspension of sacrosanct texts for a political agenda, pushed particularly by the Marxist frustration with philosophical hypothesis and dialogue as supposedly impractical for real social change—versus the dividing up of individuals based mostly on financial class, and the ensuing sport of Yahtzee (to make use of Schulz’s phrase) that Marxism desires to play with them.
Fairly than grounding one’s philosophical strategy on sacrosanct texts, wokism (like Marx’s social engineering), based on Schulz, stems from a sort of Hegelianism, although not merely Hegelian dialectic. Fairly, the cocktail ideology of wokism is pushed by what grounds Hegel’s dialectic itself: a merely mythological strategy to sacred texts, whether or not it’s spotty, Bartlett-style lip service, or (as in Hegel’s case) a pseudo-Trinitarian mythology.
One would possibly complain that Schulz cites solely himself, however that’s comprehensible if Schulz thinks that is the sort of critique that must be made, and that he’s the one particular person (or one of many solely individuals) making it. He even claims it’s scandalous that there aren’t extra studied tutorial critiques of this sort. Moreover, it’s frequent for analysis in any area of interest sub-field of philosophy to quote a small variety of students, particularly if I’m writing a weblog put up to unfold my concepts to a well-liked or spiritual viewers, which can lack sure tutorial roadblocks to understanding what I’m getting at.